EVANGELIA ALEVYZAKI

Email: ealevyzaki@hmu.gr

https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=vukNL0IAAAAJ

EDUCATION

September 2004-July PhD in Economics, University of Edinburgh

2010 Thesis Title: Microeconomic Applications in International Trade Theory

September 2003- MSc in Economics, University of Edinburgh (SGPE)

September 2004 Dissertation Title: Export subsidies and consumption: Welfare maximising

decisions and optimal support policy. The role of Consumer's surplus.

Percentage average: 68(MSc *)

September 1999- B.A.(Ptyhion) in Economic Sciences, National and Kapodestrian University

September 2003 Of Athens

Average grade: 7.69/10 (ranked 3th in the graduating class)

(January 2002- June 2002)

EXPERIENCE

Teaching Experience

Semester 2 Academic Teaching Staff, Hellenic Mediterranean University, Department of

Year 2021-22 Business Administration and Tourism, Economics

II(Macroeconomics) Tutorial

First year course in Economics. Creation, Presentation and Solution

of Macroeconomics tutorial questions.

Semester 1 Academic Teaching Fellow, Hellenic Mediterranean University, Department

Year 2021-22 of Business Administration and Tourism, Economics I

(Microeconomics) Tutorial

First year course in Economics. Creation, Presentation and Solution

of Microeconomics tutorial questions.

Semester 1 Academic Undergraduate Tutor, Issues in Global Economics, School of

Year 2010: Economics, University of Edinburgh

Second year course in Economics, with a focus on International

trade and Environmental Economics topics.

Academic Years 2004- Undergraduate Tutor, Economics 1a, School of Economics,

2007, **2009-2010** *University of Edinburgh*

First year course in Economics. Presentation and solution of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics tutorial questions.

Microeconomics and Macroeconomics tutorial questions.

Semester 2 Academic Postgraduate Helpdesk Tutor, Microeconomics, SGPE, University of

Year 2005-2006 Edinburgh

Professional Experience

July 2021- March 2022 Statistician, Greek National Statistics Agency

June 2017 – July 2017 Clerical Officer, Herakleion Center for Investment, Herakleion,

Crete, Greece

Administrator (Economics), OAED Manpower Employment **December 2015 - May**

Organization, Herakleion, Crete, Greece (Five month placement).

March 2009 - August

2009

2016

Policy Advisor, Scotland Office

October 2007 - March

2009

Assistant Economist, Transport Scotland

Other professional

<u>experience</u>

Management and Production of agricultural products (olive oil)

2014-present Family business

August 2020-

present

Volunteer Turoring- Panhellenic Exam preparation- Economics Theory-

Municipality of Heraklion Volunteer Tutors

Research Interests Microeconomic Theory, Applied Auction and Contest Theory,

> International Trade (strategic trade policies, subsidies, multinational companies, FDI), Gossiping (information transmission) and Status

SEMINARS

PEDAGOGICAL

Distance Learning Adult Education: Contemporary Approaches and Educational January 2019-March 2019

Practices, Open Education Foundation, Center for Continuous Learning,

Heraklion Crete, Greece

November 2018-

January 2019

New Technologies in Education: (1) Introduction to Technology Supported Learning, (2) Online Evaluation Tools, (2) Distance Learning, (4) Educational Platforms and Online Presentations Open Education Foundation, Center for

Continuous Learning, Heraklion Crete, Greece

November-December 2018 Digitising Higher Education, University of Arlington, Texas, edX online course

Seminar for Instructors in Adult Education, Heraklion Crete, Greece

June-July 2014

ECONOMICS

July 2015 14th Conference on Research on Economic Theory and Econometrics, CRETE

2015, Chania Crete, (July 2015)

Paper Presented: The Effect of Gossip on a Contest for Status

SGPE Annual Conference, Dunblane January 2008

Paper presented: MNCs, Entry Modes and Asymmetric Information

Evangelia Alevyzaki Academic CV

April 2007 RES Easter School 2007, International Economics, Birmingham

January 2007 SGPE Annual Conference, Dunblane

Paper Presented: Cooperation in Brander and Spencer

July 2006 5th Conference on Research on Economic Theory and Econometrics, CRETE 2006,

Rethymnon Crete, Greece

Poster Presented: Brander and Spencer with a Twist

January 2006 SGPE Annual Conference, Dunblane (January 2006) Paper Presented: Co-

production and Strategic Trade: A way of avoiding Prisoneris Dilemma in Brander

and Spencer?

European Trade Study Group (ETSG) Conference, Dublin

September 2005 Paper Presented: International Trade and Lobbying Contests

SGPE Annual Conference, Dunblane

January 2005 Paper Presented: Strategic Trade policy and Cost Heterogeneity: Lobbying as a

Signal of the Firm's efficiency

January 2004 SGPE Annual Conference, Peebles

Other Conferences,

Seminars,

Presentations and

Courses Attended

Coursera Project Network (through OAED)

December 2020-Courses in R February 2021

Getting Started with R

Importing Data into R

Building and analyzing linear regression model in R

Calculating Descriptive Statistics in R

Hypothesis Testing in R

Using Descriptive Statistics to Analyze Data in R

Intro to Time Series Analysis in R

Coursera Project Network (through OAED) February 2021

Courses in PYTHON

Create Your First Python Program

Game Theory with Python

Data Driven World, 1st Scienific Seminar on Data, University of Crete **June 2016**

Postgraduate Alumni, Herakleion Crete

October 2017-

Course on The Braille System (Certiffcate of Use), Herakleion, Crete, Greece January 2018

1st e-Marketing Conference for Business, Heraklion Crete, Greece November 2013

Research Papers (Three Chapters of doctoral thesis)

A Contest Application in Strategic Trade Theory

This paper aims to provide an answer to the inefficiency problem arising from the introduction of a cost asymmetry in an oligopolistic model of Strategic Trade Theory (Brander and Spencer (1985)). It is shown, that the use of a lobbying contest in a heterogeneous market can succeed in revealing the highest efficiency firm, as through the use of a contest, firms will expend efforts according to their abilities. Consequently, the lowest cost firm will expend the highest effort, and so the winner of the contest will be the firm that the government seeks to reward. The exertions of the participants in the contest therefore serve as signals of the particular ability of the players, hence the highest ability one will be the winner. This will be the most advantageous option for the government to set as the national champion that will compete in the international level against a single foreign firm. This in turn leads to the reduction of the a la Dixit oligopolistic asymmetric cost strategic trade model to a monopolistic one, which will either entail a cost asymmetry between the rival country monopoly firms or a cost symmetry. This will depend on the cost of the national champion compared to the cost of the foreign rival. It is also shown that the lobbying contest can be welfare enhancing compared to the asymmetric oligopoly model under certain market and cost conditions.

Cooperation in Brander and Spencer

This paper examines all potential co-operational outcomes, when the no cooperation assumption introduced in the seminal strategic trade paper by Brander and Spencer (1985) is relaxed and the two rival monopolies are characterised by cost asymmetry. The brief overview of the three potential types of agreement is followed by a detailed examination of the outcomes using a linear approximation approach. The particular outcome of each scheme, under constant marginal costs, is shown to depend on the level of cost asymmetry and the consumption levels in the producing countries. The cost asymmetry level and the market size play a significant role in a decreasing marginal cost setting. The willingness of policymakers to support cooperation is crucial for the final outcome.

MNCs, Entry Modes and Asymmetric Information-The Role of Government Intervention (Job Market Paper)

This paper is based on the observation that in recent years, a number of countries have been providing incentives to attract FDI, mostly in the form of lower taxation levels or some form of subsidisation. It aims to analyse the situation where a government would use subsidisation or taxation policies as incentives for firms to change their mode of entry towards the most welfare enhancing for the host country, when the firm optimal and the government optimal entry modes differ. To do so, the three alternative entry modes that a firm may adopt in its effort to enter a foreign market, namely exports, Greenfield FDI or acquisitions (brownfield FDI) are compared, in both a full and asymmetric information environment. It is shown that the ability of the policymaker to affect the entry mode depends on the level of the greenfield investment cost relative to the particular policy measure adopted.

Current Research (work in progress): The effect of gossip on a Contest for Status Gossiping is part of everyday life, inherent to human nature, as it enables socially the exchange of information, serves as a means of entertainment and as a way of forging friendships; but, it mainly functions as a means of evaluating one's standing in terms of ability and status. When an individual's expectation regarding her status falls short, then jealousy and envy arising from this situation, can alter the role of gossip, which can become a tool in undermining an 'opponent's' status level. This work aims to investigate the effect of gossip,

particularly malicious gossip in games of status. If in a contest framework, as described by Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2005), the effort expended by a player takes the form of the consumption of a 'positional' good and the income enjoyed by this individual provides her ability parameter, then the player expending the highest consumption will be the winner, thus enjoying the highest status level. However, if by 'gossiping' this allocation in status can be altered, agents have the incentive to not only compete in conspicuous consumption, but also in gossip exchange. The aim is to explore this potential effect of gossip on status in this contest setting.

IT SKILLS Microsoft Office (2007, 2010 (Certification INFOCERT Basic 2014)),

Mathematica, Microfit, Scientific Word, MS Project, FreeMind

Foreign Languages English (Full Professional Proficiency), German (Basic), Greek (native speaker)

References To be provided upon request